Contempt: Right to Trial by Jury Refused in Criminal Contempt Proceedings Against Public Employees Union by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 44 
Number 1 Volume 44, July 1969, Number 1 Article 26 
December 2012 
Contempt: Right to Trial by Jury Refused in Criminal Contempt 
Proceedings Against Public Employees Union 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1969) "Contempt: Right to Trial by Jury Refused in Criminal Contempt Proceedings 
Against Public Employees Union," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 44 : No. 1 , Article 26. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol44/iss1/26 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
of precedent which has recognized the validity of Mexican divorces on
the basis of comity. Moreover, Mexican divorces serve an important
socio-economic function and ought not to be dealt their death blow.
The same considerations which probably moved the Rosenstiel appel-
late courts, i.e., adultery, bigamy and illegitimacy, must still be con-
sidered when deciding whether or not section 250 will prevail, although
it may cogently be argued that since the enactment of the section, New
York domiciiaries have received fair warning of the possible conse-
quences arising from failure to comply with its mandate, and therefore
it would not offend due process or "equity" to declare such a divorce
void.132 But when a marriage is finished in fact, it is, or should be,
finished at law as well.3 3 Since divorce proceedings in New York are
cumbersome and the grounds for divorce are limited, the "quicky"
Mexican divorce often serves as the liberator of the unhappy and
troubled. It is quick, efficient and unhampered by the vestiges of Puri-
tanism which so heavily pervade our present law. Unfortunately, the
Kakarapis opinion chose to ignore section 250 rather than confront the
issues which it presents by attempting to explain its applicability, if
any, to out-of-state divorces.
To deny validity to Mexican divorces through the use of section
250 will only serve to increase traffic to sister-state divorce havens since
they are presumably unscathed by the section under the aegis of the
full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. Thus, out-of-state
divorces will not be prevented even if section 250 is held valid upon
review. It is hoped that future decisions will attempt to distinguish
Kakarapis and define the scope of section 250, or that the New York
legislature will take a serious look at the "presumption" which the
judiciary has declared presumes nothing.
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
Contempt: Right to trial by jury refused in criminal contempt pro-
ceedings against public employees union.
The New York Court of Appeals has decided that neither the
Taylor Law nor the equal protection clause of the United States Consti-
tution mandated a jury trial in Rankin v. Shanker.13 4
132 Seigel, Conflict of Laws, 19 SYRAcuSE L. Rav. 235, 262-63 (1967).
It should be noted, however, that the question of the illegitimacy of the children born
from such a marriage (i.e., a marriage entered into after at least one of the parties thereto
has obtained a foreign divorce which the New York courts may subsequently declare
void) is no longer a valid consideration. New section 24 of the DR.L declares that a child
born out of such a marriage "is the legitimate child of both natural parents notwith-
standing that such marriage is void or voidable or shall hereafter be annulled or judicially
declared void." DRL § 24, Laws of New York, 192 Sess. ch. 325 (1969).
133 See 1957 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 32 at 21-22.
134 23 N.Y.2d 111, 242 N.E2d 802, 295 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1968).
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In pursuing the constitutional argument, Chief Judge Fuld,
writing for the majority, concluded that a legislative classification which
distinguishes between public and private employees is reasonable and
hence does not violate the equal protection guarantee. Moreover,
having examined the United States Supreme Court decision in Bloom
v. Illinois,15 the Court resisted the argument that the Constitution
mandates a jury trial in all criminal contempt proceedings. Bloom only
mandated jury trials in serious as distinguished from petty crimes.
Since the Supreme Court has held that a less than six-month sentence
is insufficient to warrant a trial by jury, a jury trial was not required
in the instant case where the Judiciary Law provided for a maximum
punishment of 30 days in jail.136
It is significant that the 4-3 split in the bench was precipitated by
the public-private distinction enunciated by the majority. The distinc-
tion, necessarily valid in denying public employees the right to strike,
is not necessarily applicable when determining the right to a jury in a
criminal contempt proceeding. Presumably therefore, if the sentence in
Shanker had approximated the six-month Bloom limitation, the major-
ity position would be less tenable. It should be noted that recent amend-
ments to the Taylor Law have lodged complete discretion in the
judiciary in fixing the size of the fine.137 Should the size of the fine
ever be a controlling factor in evaluating the right to trial by jury, a
defendant may be entitled to a jury trial even though he is a public
employee.
If the instant case in effect holds that a jury trial is never required
where the punishment is so limited, there is still the latent problem
connected with misdemeanor cases currently handled by three-judge
courts in New York. A misdemeanant can presently be confined for a
period of up to one year,138 but the Bloom Court has stated that a
sentence in excess of six months requires a jury trial.
135 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
136 N.Y. Judiciary Law § 751.
137 MCKINNY'S SESSION LAiws, Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, Civil Service
Law § 212 (1969).
138 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 10.00(4).
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